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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of jealousy for
the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Jealousy implies that consump-
tion is like pollution: overconsumption may occur because households
do not internalize the costs of their consumption on others. This ex-
ternality opens the door for a bene…cial monetary policy intervention.
We show that the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy depend on the
relative strength of the consumption externality and the monopolistic
distortion. If households are “too jealous”, a rise in the money supply
reduces welfare by increasing consumption that is already ine¢ciently
high.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of jealousy for mon-
etary policy. Jealousy and the desire to "keep up with the Joneses" im-
ply that consumption is like pollution: overconsumption may occur because
households do not internalize the costs of their consumption on others. A
household which increases its consumption does not take into account its ef-
fect on the aggregate desire by other households to “keep up”. On the other
hand, in imperfectly competitive economies production tends to fall below
the social optimum. Jealousy and monopolistic competition create distor-
tions that can be potentially corrected by a monetary policy intervention.
The introduction of jealousy into a standard model allows for identifying
additional features that govern the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. The
implications of jealousy for asset-pricing and optimal taxation have caught
some attention;1 but its implications for monetary policy have attracted little
attention. In a rare paper, Pierdzioch (2003) analyses the implications of
jealousy for the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy, using of a two-country
model. He …nds that, if households are jealous, a rise in the money supply can
be a beggar-thyself policy. However, he did not provide a clear result when
monetary policy is welfare-decreasing. On the other hand, virtually all other
monetary policy models have shown that a rise in the money supply always
increases welfare. The intuition behind this result is that, under monopolistic
competition, an increase in output is welfare-improving because the level of
production is ine¢ciently low.
We show in this paper that, in the closed economy, the welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy depend on the relative strength of the consumption exter-
nality caused by and the monopolistic distortion. If the former dominates, a
rise in the money supply is welfare-reducing because an increase in output is
not desirable. If households are "too jealous", the economy su¤ers from over-
production. Therefore, a rise in the money supply is not welfare-improving
because it increases consumption that is already ine¢ciently high.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model. In Section 3, we examine the implications of jealousy for the welfare
e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1Important contributions include, but are not limited to, Dupor and Liu (2003), Gali
(1994), Guo (2005) and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000).
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2 The Model
2.1 Preferences and Market Structure
In this section, we develop a simple model to analyze the implication of
jealousy. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households. The size of
the economy is normalized to unity. The households are indexed by z 2 [0; 1].
The economy is monopolistically competitive and each household produces a
single di¤erentiated commodity. For simplicity, the model abstracts capital
formation and thus labour is the only factor of production.
The utility function of representative household i is
U i = log
¡
C i ¡ ®CA¢+ Â logµM i
P
¶
¡ ·
2
y (i)2 : (1)
The variable Ci is a CES basket of all varieties consumed by household i
C i =
24 1Z
0
ci(z)
µ¡1
µ dz
35
µ
µ¡1
;
where ci (z) is consumption of commodity z by household i and µ (> 1)
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. In the utility function,
CA is average consumption goods across all households. The parameter ®
(0 < ® < 1) captures the importance of average consumption, as we shall
explain in a moment. Â is a positive parameter, M i money holdings and P
denotes the consumer price index
P =
·Z 1
0
p (z)1¡µ dz
¸ 1
1¡µ
;
where the price of commodity z is denoted by p (z). In equation (1), y (i)
stands for the output of commodity i and · is a parameter that captures the
disutility of production.
The parameter ® captures the notion of jealousy. The utility function
implies that
@U
@CA
=
¡®
Ci ¡ ®CA < 0:
Hence, an increase in average consumption lowers the representative house-
hold’s utility level and increases the household’s marginal utility of additional
consumption. In a symmetric equilibrium where the representative household
consumes average consumption
¡
Ci = CA
¢
@U
@C i
=
1
C i
> 0:
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This equation implies that in case where every household’s consumption in-
creases in tandem, utility increases.
Let us de…ne the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and con-
sumption to be
MRSLC =
@U=@y (i)
@U=@C i
:
Thus in this model
@MRSLC
@CA
= ®y (i) > 0;
which implies that an increase in average consumption raises the marginal
utility of the representative household’s consumption relative to leisure. Again,
following Gali (1994) and Dupor and Liu (2003), we refer to this property as
“keeping up with the Joneses”. If preferences exhibit the desire to keep up
with the Joneses, the representative household derives greater utility from
additional consumption relative to leisure when other households consume
more. The keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect thus creates a consumption
externality because the households do not take into account the negative ef-
fect of their consumption on others. We can however state that the keeping
up with the Joneses e¤ect is a feature of jealousy. Henceforth, we only talk
of jealousy.
The budget constraint of the representative household is
M i + PC i =M i0 + PT + y (i) p (i) ; (2)
where M i0 is the initial money holdings and T is per capita transfers from
the government. The government repays all revenues from money creation
to the households by transfer payments. The government budget constraint,
expressed in per capita terms, is given by
0 = T +
M ¡ M0
P
:
2.2 Optimality Conditions
The representative household maximizes the utility function (1) subject to
the budget constraint (2), taking into account that it faces the downward-
sloping demand curve
y (i) =
·
p (i)
P
¸¡µ
CAD:
In this equation, CAD denotes aggregate demand for the representative com-
modity i. The representative household solves a maximization problem,
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choosing the level of consumption, money holdings and output that max-
imizes utility. The optimality conditions are
Â
µ
M i
P
¶¡1
=
1
C i ¡ ®CA ; (3)
y (i)
µ+1
µ =
(µ ¡ 1)
µ·
¡
CAD
¢ 1
µ
¡
Ci ¡ ®CA¢¡1 : (4)
Equation (3) shows the demand for money, households equate the marginal
utility from holding money to the opportunity cost of acquiring it. Equation
(4) is the labour-leisure trade-o¤ condition. Households equate the marginal
disutility of producing an extra unit of output to the marginal utility from
consuming the added revenue that the extra unit of output brings.
3 Jealousy and Monetary Policy
3.1 A Symmetric Steady State
Later in this paper, we analyze the dynamic response of the economy to a
rise in the money supply. To do this, we need a well-speci…ed steady state
around which we log-linearize the model. As we show, it turns out that the
steady state level of output is crucial to the main result of this paper.
Consider, for simplicity, a symmetric equilibrium where
¹y0 (i) = ¹C
AD
0 = ¹C
i
0 = ¹C
A
0 ;
where 0 subscripts on barred variables denote the initial symmetric steady
state. The preceding equation shows that we consider a symmetric equilib-
rium where the representative household consumes average consumption. In
this case the …rst-order condition governing the optimal choice of output,
equation (4), implies that in equilibrium
¹y0 (i) =
·
(µ ¡ 1)
µ· (1¡ ®)
¸ 1
2
: (5)
A social planner would internalize the consumption externality by setting
Ci = CAD and maximize the utility of consumption net of the costs of forgone
leisure
max
y
h
log (1¡ ®) y ¡ ·
2
y2
i
:
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The solution is given by
¹ySP0 =
µ
1
·
¶1
2
: (6)
The comparison between equations (5) and (6) shows that two factors induce
that, in the decentralized equilibrium, the output level can di¤er from the so-
cial optimum. First, in the decentralized equilibrium the marginal value of an
additional unit of consumption exceeds the cost of forgone leisure. Thus mo-
nopolistic competition induces a distortion which magnitude is determined
by the term (µ ¡ 1)=µ. Second, under keeping up with the Joneses, a house-
hold derives greater utility from additional consumption relative leisure when
other households consumer more. Jealousy, therefore, tends to raise output.
The relative magnitudes of these distortions determine whether the level of
output exceeds the social optimum.
The comparison between (5) and (6) implies that
¹ySP0 < ¹y0 (i) ; if ® >
1
µ
; (7)
¹ySP0 > ¹y0 (i) ; if ® <
1
µ
: (8)
According to the preceding equations, the consumption externality caused
by jealousy can more than o¤set the negative e¤ect caused by monopolistic
competition. In this case, equilibrium output (consumption) is ine¢ciently
high. On the other hand, if the households are only little jealous, the socially
optimal output level exceeds the output level realized in the decentralized
equilibrium. Therefore, we can conclude that jealousy is not necessarily a
vice – on the contrary – jealousy can a virtue. Moderate jealousy can partly
o¤set the imperfect competition distortion by increasing output closer to
the social optimum without causing overconsumption. Hence, jealousy does
not necessarily imply equilibrium overconsumption unlike Dupor and Liu
concluded (2003, 427).
3.2 The Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy
The next step is to study the implications of jealousy for monetary policy.
To do this, we analyze a log-linear version of the model and consider an
unanticipated rise in the money supply. Assume that all prices are …xed
and output is demand-determined. The log-linearized version of equation
(3) implies that M^ = C^, where the percentage deviations from the initial
steady state are denoted by hats. The parameter ® does not a¤ect the log-
linear version of the model. Thus jealousy does not a¤ect the response of
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the economy to a rise in the money supply. On the other hand, jealousy has
notable implications for economic welfare.
Ignoring the welfare e¤ects of real balances, total di¤erentiation of the
utility function yields to
dU i = C^ ¡ ·¹y20C^:
Using of equation (5), which gives initial steady-state output, the preceding
equation becomes
dU i =
·
1¡ (µ ¡ 1)
µ (1¡ ®)
¸
M^ :
Hence, a rise in the money supply is welfare-decreasing if
® >
1
µ
:
Recalling equation (7), we can conclude that a rise in the money supply
decreases welfare if the level of output exceeds the socially optimal level of
output. The intuition behind this result is the following. A rise in the money
supply increases demand. Since the initial level of output is already ine¢-
ciently high, a rise in the money supply only worsens the overconsumption
problem. Thus a rise in the money supply is not desirable and it decreases
welfare. On the other hand, a rise in the money supply increases welfare
if steady-state output is ine¢ciently low. In this case, a rise in the money
supply increases output that is ine¢ciently low and consequently increases
welfare.
Virtually all monetary policy models have shown that a rise in the money
supply always increases welfare. The intuition behind this result is straight-
forward. Under monopolistic competition, an increase in output increases
welfare because the level of production is ine¢ciently low. On the other
hand, Pierdzioch (2003) …nds that a rise in the money supply can be welfare-
reducing if households are jealous. In his model, a rise in the money supply
has an e¤ect on welfare by a¤ecting the terms of trade and the level of out-
put. However, it is not completely clear when a rise in the money supply is a
beggar-thyself policy. In this paper it is shown that, in the closed economy,
the conditions under which a rise in the money supply is welfare-decreasing
are transparent. If the closed economy su¤ers from overconsumption caused
by jealousy, then a rise in the money supply is welfare-decreasing.
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4 Conclusions
Jealousy implies that consumption is like pollution: overconsumption may
occur because households do not internalize the costs of their consumption
on others. This externality opens the door for a bene…cial monetary policy
intervention. We show that jealousy is a key feature in governing the wel-
fare e¤ects of monetary policy. In contrast to virtually all monetary policy
models, we show that a rise in the money supply can be welfare-decreasing.
The intuition behind this result is clear. If households are “too jealous”,
the economy su¤ers from overconsumption and a rise in the money supply
worsens the overconsumption problem.
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